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Abstract We present an EEG-based experimental investigation on additive dis-
course continuations of factive sentences according to a pattern: Paul knows that
Peter takes the bus. Louis too takes/knows . . . . We want to determine whether
reference to the main content (with knows) or to the presupposition (with takes)
elicits a different brain response. We conclude from the data that there is no trace of
electrical waveforms usually associated with deviation from a norm or reprocessing,
although there is an observable moderate contrast in the 250-400 ms time window
at frontal sites, which is in need of controlled replication to be properly interpreted.
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1 Introduction
The literature on presuppositions has its fundamental raison d’être in a distinction
between the main content (MC) and the presupposition (PP) conveyed by presup-
positional expressions. Most observations converge towards the conclusion that it
is difficult for a PP to be the focus of an utterance or to be a focus source, that is,
to introduce a question that subsequent discourse is going to address. We take the
distinction between PP and MC to be empirically well-established in this regard.
However, the cognitive inner workings of the distinction are still largely unexplored
and the role of PPs as topics is not well-understood. In particular, it is not clear
whether the asymmetry of MC and PP extends to the topic function, perhaps in
virtue of an intrinsic salience difference between MC and PP. The goal of this paper
is to present the first steps of an experimental approach to the question of PPs as
topics. We use an EEG-based technique and an additive relation marked by aussi
(too) in French in order to determine whether reference to the MC and to the PP
elicits different brain responses. We first provide a general linguistic (Section 2.1)
and experimental (2.2) background to motivate the two experiments described in
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Sections 3.1 and 3.2, before discussing the results in Section 3.3. We conclude by de-
riving from the results and the general state-of-the art some reasonable experimental
follow-ups (Section 4).
2 Motivation for the experiment
2.1 Some fundamental intuitions
Although the literature on presuppositions is large, there are a number of recurring
themes that suggest the existence of common intuitions. We will mention the three
features which seem to be dominant across the works of the last forty years.
The first feature is that the expressions which convey a presupposition (the so
called presupposition triggers) jointly communicate two pieces of information, the
main content (MC) or at-issue content and the presupposition (PP). For instance,
Mary stopped dancing communicates that Mary has not been dancing after some
past time point t (the MC) and that she was dancing before t (the PP). According to
Potts (2005), this twofold informational character contrasts with conventional impli-
catures, for instance expressives like damn, appositives or evaluative adverbs like
unfortunately. In Unfortunately, Mary stopped dancing, the adverb communicates
that the proposition/fact conveyed by the clause to which it adjoins is regrettable
(presumably for the speaker). The proposition/fact evaluated by the adverb is in a
sense independent from the implicature trigger (unfortunately), in that suppressing
the trigger leaves the proposition/fact untouched.
The second feature corresponds to three types of observations, which can be
grouped together under the general heading of ‘discourse non-integration’.
Discourse connection PPs generally resist discourse connection (Ducrot 1972).
(1) is an unproblematic sentence, which asserts that Paul has no caviar for breakfast
because caviar is too expensive and presupposes that he had caviar before. The
because-clause is interpreted as targeting the MC. In contrast, (2) is (more) difficult
to interpret and, whatever construal a reader/hearer is able to come up with,1 it most
probably won’t be an attachment to the PP, that is, the sentence is not going to be
interpreted as ‘Paul does not have caviar for breakfast and he had caviar before
because he liked caviar’.
(1) Paul stopped having caviar for his breakfast because it’s too expensive.
(2) # Paul stopped having caviar for his breakfast because he liked that.
1 A possible construal, in the context of (1), is that Paul wanted to save money and decided to stop
caviar because he liked caviar so much that he spent too much money on it.
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Answerhood PPs do not in general provide natural answers to questions (Grimshaw
1979). The two responses in (3) sound off the track.
(3) Question: Did Bill leave?
Response 1: It’s odd that he did.
Response 2: I had forgotten that he did.
Grimshaw’s example 154, p. 321
Projection Finally, there is the well-known projection phenomenon, the fact that
PPs are not necessarily affected by truth-inversion (negation) or truth-suspension
operators (interrogation, modals), which negate or suspend the MC. For instance,
with Did Mary stop dancing?, the MC is not asserted whereas the PP is still there.
See Beaver & Geurts 2013; Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet 1990; Geurts 1999 for
more detailed lists of projection configuration.
The third and last feature is the backgrounded nature of PPs. Stalnaker (1974)
defends the view that PPs are ‘normally’ members of the common ground when the
PP trigger is used in a sentence. It is not easy to form a clear conception of what
‘normally’ could mean. In a famous passage, Stalnaker (1974: 473) introduces the
idea that a speaker presupposes that P if he believes or assumes that P, plus a number
of other conditions.2 However, Stalnaker (1974: 474) concedes that sometimes there
is no such belief or assumption: “In such a case, a speaker tells his auditor something
in part by pretending that his auditor already knows it. The pretense need not be an
attempt at deception. It might be tacitly recognized by everyone concerned that this
is what is going on, and recognized that everyone else recognizes it.”
This modulation of the main theme anticipates the recent Abbott vs. Stalnaker
debate (Abbott 2008; Stalnaker 2008). In a nutshell, if PPs can be new information
(‘informative’), what room is left for their backgrounded character? Stalnaker had
already faced this problem in Stalnaker 1974: 480, fn 3 when he discusses Sadock’s
example of an informative PP. B’s answer is appropriate even in a context where it is
clear that A did not know that B has a sister.
(4) A: Are you going to lunch?
B: No, I’ve got to pick up my sister.
Examples such as (4) prompted Stalnaker to reconsider his definition of the
common ground, essentially by separating the set of common beliefs from the
common ground proper, which he defines as follows in Stalnaker 2002: 716.
(5) Common ground
It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose
2 These conditions have to do with shared beliefs and are not directly relevant to our discussion.
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of the conversation) that φ , and all believe that all accept that φ , and all
believe that all believe that all accept that φ , etc.
Acceptance corresponds to treating a proposition as true for some reason. In
contrast to common ground as shared belief, the new notion of common ground
allows for situations in which participants all doubt that φ is true while accepting it
for various reasons and believing that they (believe that . . . they believe that they)
accept it, see the Martini example, inspired from Donellan, in Stalnaker 2002: 717-
718.
In this new approach to common ground, speaker presuppositions “will be, as
before, the speaker’s beliefs about the common ground” (Stalnaker 2002: 717).
Clearly, there is a temporal dimension to be added to make the proposal more
coherent. At the moment the corresponding PP trigger is used, a truly informative
PP does not coincide with a belief that the PP is accepted. The option that Stalnaker
seems to favor is one in which the speaker believes that the PP will be accepted at
the end of the speech act (“at the appropriate point in the conversation” (Stalnaker
2002: 710)). This is in particular the case when the speaker is presumed to be
competent, as in the case of the sister example (4).
However, it has been argued that the time-based account of Stalnaker might run
into problems with sentences of type (6), see Szabó 2006; von Fintel 2006. Imagine
a context in which it is common belief that some of the addressees don’t know that
the speaker has a sister. Intuitively, (6) might sound odd, even if we assume that the
existence of a sister is accommodated after the speech act, given that the speaker is
normally competent about the structure of her family. A straightforward explanation
for the oddness of (6) is that, at the time the utterance is issued, it might be false
that the existence of a sister is in the common ground, and so it would be simply
wrong in that case to assert that the participants all know that the speaker has a
sister. A way out is to assume that the present tense in (6) picks out a time before
accommodation (this is apparently von Fintel’s interpretation of the problem, as
construed by Szabó (2006: 7) and also one of Stalnaker’s interpretations in his reply
to Abbott (2008)). Szabó (2006: 7) casts doubt on this possibility by asking what the
reference of the present tense is. If the reference can be shifted to a time point after
the accommodation has taken place, there is no reason why (6) should be odd.
(6) We all know that I have a sister.
Stalnaker’s answer to Szabó (and to Abbott, who endorses Szabó’s objection) in
his 2008 paper takes into account two possibilities. If the present tense refers to a
state of affairs simultaneous with the utterance, then, clearly, the sentence is false in
a context where the existence of a sister is not common belief. If the present tense
can refer to a point after the end of the statement, Stalnaker claims that the resulting
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meaning is “we all will know, as soon as I finish talking, that I have a sister”, which
is a strangely indirect way of communicating that the speaker has a sister. So, under
the first interpretation, the sentence is false and, under the second, it is odd.
Stalnaker’s second interpretation is spurious. No natural dialogue based on it can
be constructed. Imagine the exchange in (7). It sounds very strange. What could B’s
answer mean? Certainly not “Yes, as soon as you finished talking I knew/learned
that you had a sister”.
(7) A: You know that I have a sister.
B: Yes, this is exactly what happened.
So, von Fintel’s answer to Szabó’s objection is basically correct: if there is any
oddness with (6), it is simply due to the fact that sentence makes reference to a time
where what it asserts (that the existence of a sister is in the set of shared beliefs) is
false. To see what can happen after (6) has been uttered, the example has to be put
in the more general context of conversational planning.
The role of conversational planning has been studied from different perspectives,
for instance quite generally in a theory of action and communication in the Belief-
Desire-Intention (BDI) model (Wooldridge 2000) or in the more specific setting of
Question Under Discussion (QUD) models (Roberts 2012; Ginzburg 2012). While
there are significant differences between these families of models, they agree on the
idea that a conversational move (or its absence, as when an utterance is not explicitly
rejected) reflects the goals and anticipations of a speaker. If a contrary-to-facts
utterance is issued at some point in the discourse, it can be accepted if its relevance
to other, more important moves, is judged very weak or negligible. If the central
criterion is the relevance with respect to conversational planning, it may be the case
that the PP is the crucial piece of information at some point in the discourse, as
argued at length in Simons, Tonhauser, Beaver & Roberts 2011. For instance, with
(6), if the speaker happens to base an argument on the existence of a sister and if
some other participant (i) happens to believe that the speaker might be lying and (ii)
considers the argument as consequential to a sufficient extent, she might attack the
PP to defeat the argument. Alternatively, if nothing essential hinges on the fact that
the speaker has a sister or that, actually, not everybody was aware of the speaker
having a sister, (6) can perfectly well go on its way without further ado.
Summarizing, the fate of (6) in the subsequent part of the conversation turns on
factors which are essentially the same for the MC and the PP. This does not entail
that the initial situation, which obtains just after the utterance has been issued, is
the same for the MC and the PP. In order to preserve Stalnaker’s central insight and
to avoid the interpretation problems noted for (6), we formulate a more cautious
definition of (speaker) PP.
(8) A discourse participant a attributes to a speaker s issuing an utterance u the
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presupposition that φ if and only a, after hearing u, believes that s acts as if
she believes that φ is in the common ground or will be in the common ground
after u, where the common ground is the set of accepted beliefs, as in (5).
There are mainly two scenarios of attribution. Either φ is a manifest piece
of information, which is presumably accessible to everybody, or s uses a form of
words through which she communicates that she presupposes that φ . The latter case
corresponds to the use of a PP trigger.
(9) A PP trigger in an utterance u is a form of words by which a speaker conven-
tionally communicates that she believes that the presupposed part is in the
common ground or will be in the common ground after u.
The conventional character of PP triggers is in line with Stalnaker’s own per-
spective, see for instance Stalnaker 2002: 705. However, the definition is restricted
to linguistic or communicative PPs and does not cover cases of purely pragmatic
PPs, those which concern accessible information in the context without any linguis-
tic/signaling correlate.
Gathering the three features we have reviewed, paired information, discourse
non-integration and backgroundedness, we see that, in spite of their differences, they
converge towards the idea of an asymmetry between MC and PP, more precisely the
idea that, unless the context gives evidence to the contrary, the PPs are subtracted
from the main flow of discourse. They are ‘normally’ not going to be confirmed,
rejected or discussed in any way, even though participants in the conversation can
decide otherwise (conversational planning) in function of the context.
2.2 Topic, focus and salience
Under the perspective of Section 2.1, the MC vs. PP asymmetry closely parallels the
focus vs. topic asymmetry and might prove to be essentially similar. More precisely,
adopting Erteschik-Shir’s (2007) framework, we assume that topics and focuses
can be represented as a dynamic structure of pointers (discourse referents) with a
recency hierarchy. The basic idea is that recovering a topic entails finding a recent
pointer and introducing a focus entails creating a new pointer and assigning high
recency to it (indefinites) or locating an existing pointer and assigning high recency
to it (definites). As usual, pointers may have different types, referring for instance to
individuals or events.
For instance, consider (10). One can distinguish two focuses, F1 and F2. F1
corresponds to a question of the form Why p, where p is the proposition that John
stopped smoking. p is a PP of (10-A). F2 correspond to the property of being too
expensive, which is asserted of the topic it, co-referential with the PP p′ of p, that
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John had been smoking. So we have two PPs, each one providing a topic for a focus
in (10-B).
(10) A: Why did John stop smoking?
B: [Because [it]T2 [was too expensive.]F2]F1.
While (10) is a natural exchange, (11) sounds odd. The reason for this oddness
is intuitively clear: we are trying to force a topic-source element (the cake) into a
typical focus slot (a cleft NP).
(11) A: Who ate the cake, John or Mary?
B: # It was the cake that John ate.
It has been shown in Cowles, Kluender, Kutas & Polinsky 2007 that dialogs
like (11) elicit specific brain responses. The main goal of Cowles et al.’s (2007)
experiment is to compare the on-line reactions of participants to congruent and
incongruent dialogs like the following one.
(12) A: A queen, an advisor and a banker were arguing over taxes. Who did the
queen silence with a word, the banker or the advisor?
B: It was the banker that the queen silenced. CONGRUENT
C: It was the queen that silenced the banker. INCONGRUENT
Cowles et al. used the standard technique of measuring voltage changes on the
scalp by placing electrodes on it and amplifying the signal. Plotting the variations
over time gives an electroencephalogram (EEG), from which one can extract par-
ticular waveforms or potentials associated with specific events (bodily movements,
peceptions, cognitive tasks, etc.), hence the name event-related potential (ERP).
ERPs are classified by their orientation, (average) latency and scalp localization.
For instance the code N400 refers to a negative deflection peaking somewhere be-
tween 200 and 500 ms after stimulus onset for visual presentation of words. It is
generally maximal at centro-parietal electrodes and tends to be left-lateralized for
visual presentation of words. The zoo of ERPs is rich (Kappenman & Luck 2011)
but the three main ERPs of interest for linguists are the P300, the N400 and the
P600. The P300 is usually associated with attentional phenomenal and is not directly
relevant in the context of our experiments. The N400 is taken to be, among other
things, an indicator of semantic incompatibility or discourse non-plausibility (Kutas
& Federmeier 2011). The status of the P600 is less clear. It has been observed
for syntactic reprocessing or conflicts but recent work suggests that it has a wider
range of causes, having to do with integration difficulties in information processing
(Brouwer, Fitz & Hoeks 2012).
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The main finding3 in Cowles et al. 2007 is the presence of a negative deflection
between 200 and 500 ms after the critical word onset (banker vs. queen in (12-B)
vs. (12-C)). Cowles et al. (2007) discuss the morphology of the observed waveform
and argue that it should be considered as a member of the N400 family.
If the mentioned N400 indexes essentially the mismatch between plausible and
actual focus, as in (11) and (12), one is tempted to predict that examples like (10)
should not elicit the same brain response. However, on closer look, (10) reveals
a peculiar structure. The MC of (10-B) can be paraphrased by “The reason why
John stopped smoking is that smoking was too expensive”. The it topic in (10-B)
is involved into a proposition (that smoking was too expensive) which is part of
the focus (F1) of the answer to the (10-A) question. The representation in (10-B)
suggests that there is no topic paired with the F1 focus. An alternative approach, in
the spirit of QUD-based theories, would posit a topic corresponding to the proposition
that John stopped smoking. The form of (10-B) would then be (13).
(13) [John stopped smoking]T1 [because [it]T2 [was too expensive.]F2]F1.
The focus of (13) contains a reference (T2) to the PP of the topic (T1) but it is
connected to the MC of the same topic. F1 is an explanation of why T1 holds, not
of why John had been smoking (the PP of T1). In this respect, it complies with the
linking law of Ducrot 19724, that is, the constraint according to which, with certain
discourse markers (including causal/explanatory ones) it is not possible to attach a
discourse constituent to the PP of a different constituent exclusively.
Combining the restrictions on focus congruence illustrated by Cowles et al. 2007
and the linking law of Ducrot 1972 does not give us the whole story. We don’t
know what happens in general when we select as topic a PP exclusively. In Jayez
2010 it is shown that native speakers massively reject forced attachments to the
PP alone, but there are only two types of discourse connections studied in Jayez’s
work, consequence (therefore type) and justification (because type). Moreover, the
experimental procedure is based on naturalness judgments and does not provide
any insight on the on-line processing of sentences. Given the intuition emerging
from Section 2.1, it is possible that there is some difference between MC and PP,
even though there is no blatant violation of focus congruence or the linking law.
If the MC is more salient or activated than the PP, referring to the PP would be
less expected than referring to the MC and a sentence that would require the non-
preferred reference in order to be interpreted could be more marked than a sentence
compatible with the preferred reference. This markedness difference might then
have an effect on the cognitive processing of these two categories of sentences.
3 There are other interesting observations and questions in their work, but they seem to be orthogonal
to our main issue.
4 Loi d’enchaînement in French.
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Building an experimental strategy to address this possibility has to take into
account at least three additional aspects. First, candidate measures for the problem
must be time-locked, that is, they must follow the real processing sequence as tightly
as possible. Second, one should compare the MC and the PP for the same trigger.
Although comparing the on-line processing of different triggers can provide useful
information as to the processing speed (Schwarz 2015), it is more difficult to draw
conclusions than in the unique trigger configuration. Third, the variety of triggers
creates possible confounds.With aspectual verbs such as start or stop, the MC
coincides with the final stage of the transition. Several experimental studies suggest
that there is a cognitive advantage for the endpoint of a transition. For instance,
Nuthmann & van der Meer (2005) observe a stronger pupillary response and longer
response times for pairs like shrinking-small than for pairs like shrinking-large,
which suggests that the final stage is cognitively dominant in the representation
of transitions. If this is true, this feature could seriously bias a study comparing
the MC and the PP of aspectual verbs, since the MC could inherit some cognitive
priority from its final status in the transition. Another problematic class is that of
exclusives, whose semantic status is complex (Coppock & Beaver 2014). Even if
we adopt a conservative stance and assume that exclusives presuppose a proposition
corresponding to the modified sentence (e.g. only S presupposes the proposition
expressed by S), the fact remains that the PP is explicit whereas the MC is not.
This difference in the degree of explicitness might influence the processing in a way
orthogonal to our primary concern. Finally, anaphoric elements like too involve a
number of parameters in addition to the MC vs. PP distinction, in particular distance
to antecedent (Callahan 2009; Kim 2015).
Given these potential sources of difficulty, we decided to start with factive verbs,
because they seem to be free from possibly interacting factors and provide the nearest
equivalent to a baseline with respect to explicitness, anaphoric distance and temporal
ordering. The idea was to compare reference to the MC and the PP after a factive
sentence. Following Winterstein 2011, we used an additive discourse relation marked
by the French adverb aussi (too, also), in order to circumvent the strong effect of
consequence and justification discourse relations (Ducrot 1972; Jayez 2010). The
two basic patterns are shown in (14) and (15). (14) uses the masculine clitic pronoun
le to refer either to the proposition corresponding to the complement clause of the
first sentence (Peter takes the bus) or to the complement noun (the bus). Coreference
is indicated by underlining. In (14), at the moment the clitic is seen, it is ambiguous
between a propositional and an individual denotation. In (15), the whole complement
sentence or noun is repeated and the ambiguity does not extend beyond the additive
adverb (aussi).
(14) a. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre prend le bus.
Peter takes the bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
le
it
sait.
knows
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‘Paul knows that Peter takes the bus. Louis too knows that.’
b. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le bus.
the bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
le
it
prend.
takes
‘Paul knows that Peter takes the bus. Louis too takes it.’
(15) a. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le
the
bus.
bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le
the
bus;
bus
‘Paul knows that Peter takes the bus. Louis too knows that Peter takes the
bus.’
b. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le
the
bus.
bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
prend
takes
le
the
bus.
bus
‘Paul knows that Peter takes the bus. Louis too takes the bus.’
In order to tap into the on-line processing of the sentence, we ran two EEG
experiments on the clitic and non-clitic patterns. If reference to the PP is dispreferred,
we expect to detect an identifiable ERP (typically, an 400 or a P600) shortly after
the onset of the word that dissipates the referential ambiguity, as indicated by the
arrow in (16) for the case with a clitic.
(16) a. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le
the
bus.
bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
le
it
sait↑
knows
b. Paul
Paul
sait
knows
que
that
Pierre
Peter
prend
takes
le
the
bus.
bus.
Louis
Louis
aussi
too
le
it
prend↑
takes
3 The experiments
3.1 Experiment 1 (the clitic pattern)
Participants 31 undergraduate students were recruited. All were right-handed
native speakers without neurological disorders and with normal or corrected to
normal vision. They were paid for their participation. After artifact rejection, 9
participants were not kept for data analysis. Of the remaining 22 participants, 14
were female and 8 male with an age range of 18-24 for a mean of 20.7.
Design and materials We used 132 sentences, 88 sentences based on 22 factive
verbs plus 44 fillers. The 88 experimental sentences were divided into two groups
of 44 sentences each, corresponding to the reference to the MC vs. reference to
the PP conditions. Each factive verb appeared two times under each condition.
610
Presuppositions and salience
The frequencies, syllable number and letter number of MC and PP verbs were
aligned and morphological/phonological competitors were avoided. We used 132
first-name triples, so that the first-names were different for each stimulus and no
first-name was repeated across stimuli. About 25% of the sentences were followed
by a comprehension yes-no question to keep participants attentive. 12 questions
concerned the fillers and 24 the experimental stimuli. The stimuli were pseudo-
randomized so that each set of stimuli started with a filler and there was a regular
pattern, each filler being followed by two experimental stimuli. The disambiguating
verb was always the last word of the sentence.
Measures Electro-physiological data were recorded from a 128 channel dense
array EEG using an EGITM Geodesic Sensor Net with standard settings for language
processing (vertex Cz electrode as online reference, epochs between -300 and 1000
ms around onset, sampling rate of 500 Hz5, baseline correction of 300 ms). Artifacts
were semi-automatically rejected with BrainVision Analyzer 2. Due to a noise
percentage of 25% or higher, 9 participants were taken out.
Procedure Participants were seated in a quiet room in front of a computer screen.
They were instructed to read silently the contents of the screen. The full first sentence
appeared on the screen. After they had understood the first sentence, they pressed
a key and the second sentence appeared word by word in the center of the screen,
following the Rapid Serial Word Paradigm with 300 ms duration and 300 ms blank
screen (SOA 600 ms). They answered the yes-no questions by pressing dedicated
colored keys on the keyboard of the computer. A five-minute break occurred in the
middle of the experiment (66 stimuli).
Results The electrode array was divided into a number of regions, frontal, tempo-
ral, central, parietal, fronto-central, fronto-temporal and centro-parietal, which have
been shown to host interesting scalp voltage differences in various experimental
procedures. For a number of temporal windows, a one-way analysis of variance with
repeated measures was conducted for each region in order to compare the two con-
ditions of reference to the MC vs. reference to the PP. A parallel linear mixed-model
analysis with intercept and slope correction for participants and electrodes as random
factor was conducted. The waveforms for the different sites are shown in Figure 1
on page 613.6 The 250-550 time window does not suggest any N400 effect and the
5 So a data point corresponds to 2 ms in the signal.
6 The extended electrode sites correspond to a slightly larger number of electrodes for some standard
regions.
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differences between MC and PP are always non-significant for all regions. How-
ever the time region of the P600 gives rise to a positive deflection at fronto-central
electrodes and centro-parietal electrodes seem to show a late positivity. The differ-
ences are significant in each case: F(1,18) = 9.6, p= 0.006, t =−2.255 (reference
level = MC) for the fronto-central electrodes in the 550-800 range, F(1,18) = 11.8,
p= 0.003, t =−3.1 for the extended fronto-central electrodes in the 550-800 range,
F(1,18) = 9.8, p = 0.0057, t = −2.5 for the centro-parietal site in the 650-900
range, F(1,18) = 10.43, p= 0.0046, t =−2.78 for the extended centro-parietal site
in the 650-900 range.
However, two aspects have to be taken into account. The amplitude of the
positive deflection is low. We are around 2 and, so, far from the 4-5 amplitudes
generally reported in papers mentioning a P600 or a late positivity. Moreover,
the clitic used in the experiment might trigger an effect that we did not control.
In one case it must resolved to a nominal complement denoting a physical object
(the bus). In the other case it is resolved to a clause denoting an abstract object (a
proposition or a fact). We don’t know whether these differences are marginal or have
a noticeable impact on the processing. This question motivated the construction of
another experiment without the clitic.
3.2 Experiment 2 (the non-clitic pattern)
Participants Thirty undergraduate students were recruited. All were right-handed
native speakers without neurological disorders and with normal or corrected to
normal vision. They had not participated in experiment 1 and were paid for their
participation. After artifact rejection, 9 participants were not kept for data analysis.
Of the remaining 21 participants, 10 were female and 11 male with an age range of
18-27 for a mean of 20.9.
Design, materials and procedure The stimuli in experiment 2 were absolutely
parallel to those of experiment 1 (the same verbs occurring with the same first names
and complement clauses/nouns in the same order). The only difference was that the
clitic was replaced by the full complement, as in (15). The procedure was the same
as in experiment 1.
Results The visual results are in Figure 2 on page 614. The data were subjected
to the same analysis as for experiment 1 The P600-like effect on the MC disap-
peared completely at centro-parietal and fronto-central sites. There are two other
candidates for a difference. At fronto-central site, the PP is visually higher in the
650-900 window, but the difference is not significant (F(1,17) = 3.045, p = 0.1,
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t = 1.58 with reference-level on the MC, for the extended fronto-central set of elec-
trodes). At frontal and fronto-central sites the MC is visually lower in the 250-400
window. For frontal and fronto-central electrodes, the difference does not reach sig-
nificance F(1,17) = 3.415, p= 0.08, t = 1.713 with reference-level on the MC, and
F(1,17) = 4.057, p= 0.06, t = 1.752. It is significant for extended fronto-central
site: F(1,17) = 5.023, p= 0.04, t = 2.09.
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Figure 1 MC and PP waveforms for experiment 1
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Figure 2 MC and PP waveforms for experiment 2
3.3 Discussion
The most obvious aspect of the results is the absence of any strong effect (amplitude
waveform ' 4). In particular, there is no evidence of an N400 or P600 effect, once
one gets rid of the clitic. This is compatible with the following hypothesis: the PP
of factive verbs is as accessible as the MC when it forms the topic of an additive
relation marked by aussi (too). It is also in agreement with Winterstein’s (2011)
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claim that aussi can freely refer to a PP whenever it plausible, given the context
and the world-knowledge. More precisely, the present results suggest the following
disjunction: (i) there is no salience difference between the MC and the PP of factive
verbs or (ii) such a difference exists but does not affect the referring preferences of
aussi, whether in terms of deviance (N400) or in terms of reprocessing (P600). The
empirical support for this disjunction comes from the fact that, when we observe
differences, their amplitude is much more limited than what is described in the ERP
literature, and that the most significant difference is observed for the experiment with
clitic in the centro-parietal and fronto-central regions and is absent in the experiment
without clitic, which suggests that it is the clitic pronoun and not the MC vs. PP
contrast which is responsible for the difference in waveforms. This is not surprising
if one keeps in mind that, in contrast to the experiment without clitic, the clitic
pronoun has to be resolved in experiment 1 and this is likely to interact with the
constraints affecting anaphora resolution.
Concerning the 250-400 region, we noticed a more negative deflection for the
MC at the frontal and fronto-central sites. Although the size of the deflection is
small (/−2.5), the tendency seems to be robust at these sites. In the classification
of ERPs, what we observed can be tentatively assimilated to an N300. The N300
ERP is usually observed in the context of visuo-spatial processing (e.g. repetition
in face presentation) or emotional particles (exclamations). Franklin, Dien, Neely
& Huber (2007: 1065) speculate that the N300 effect they observed in a priming
task “reflects an expectancy process that is sensitive to category membership and/or
semantic similarity”. A replication of experiment 2 is necessary to make sure that
the observed waveform is not accidental. If it is not, it can be taken as an indication
of a difference between MC and PP.
The interpretation is complicated by the possibility that the observed waveform
just mirrors the parietal waveforms, as suggested by the first two waveforms of
Figure 2 and their combined version in Figure 3, in which case we would just
observe the mirror image of a relatively expected attention-driven P300.
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Frontal compared to Parietal
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Figure 3 A mirror effect?
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the first stage of an investigation of the differential
properties of MC and PP from an experimental point of view. We have shown that,
for factive verbs, reference to the MC or the PP by means of aussi (too) does not
give rise to an N400 or P600 ERP. We have noticed a potential N300 difference,
which remains to be confirmed and interpreted. The design of the two reported
experiments makes the PP or the MC a topic and the discourse relation an additive
one. It is thus legitimate to ask whether one would obtain similar results when
the MC/PP is a focus and/or the discourse relation is different. The answer to the
topic/focus part of the questions seems obvious. Given the projection properties
and the non-answerhood of PPs (Grimshaw 1979), we expect to see brain signals of
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deviation. However, the nature of these signals (for instance, N400, P600 or some
combination thereof) remains to be established. The combination of topic status with
non-additive discourse relations for factive verbs is the next step on our experimental
agenda.
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